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Toward a Better Understanding of Self-Construal Theory: An Agency View of the Processes 
of Self-Construal  
Abstract 
This article offers a novel perspective on self-construal theory. Self-construal concerns how 
individuals understand who they are in relation to the broad set of cultural influences in 
which they live. We look at the nature and antecedents of self-construal, and characterize it as 
a self-process, rather than self-knowledge. Integrating work from the literature on social and 
evolutionary psychology, and philosophy, we suggest that the differences between 
independent and interdependent self-construal are best understood from a self-agency 
perspective. This concerns how people assess whether they are the causes of an action and, if 
so, whether their causal role depends on other people. We introduce and discuss the roles of 
three different modalities of agency involved in agency assessment: implicit (sensorimotor), 
intermediate (self-related affordances), and explicit (reflective) self-agency. We offer a 
conceptual model on how self-agency relates to power, evolutionary motivations and to 
social and cultural affordances, in the formation of, and interaction with, different types of 
dominant independent and interdependent self-construals.  
Keywords: self-construal, self-agency, power, social and cultural affordances, social 
environment, evolutionary psychology    
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In 1991, Markus and Kitayama published an article that focused on a fundamental 
question of psychology—namely, the relationship between the individual self and the social 
and cultural setting. This became one of the most influential articles of the decade, referred to 
by Devine and Brodish (2003, p. 200) as a ‘modern classic in social psychology’; it is the 
fourth (see Footnote 1) most cited Psychological Review paper in the web of science 
(Anderson, 2011). Self-construal theory’s original framing—the first systematic social 
psychological attempt to map the relationship between culture and the self—remains 
powerfully insightful today. 
Self-construal theory introduced a new way to understand the individual 
consequences of cross-cultural differences, in terms of their implications for the construal of 
the self. Relating the debates on Eastern versus Western values to the individual level, 
Markus and Kitayama (1991) were the first to attempt to fully conceptualize the 
consequences of culture on self-perception, relating it to the central social psychological 
question of the role of others in the formation of the self-concept. Markus and Kitayama 
outlined the ways in which the broad cultural differences between (for example) the USA and 
Eastern Asia (e.g., in terms of core values such as individualism and collectivism) were 
related to different ways in which the sense of self has expected, actual and ideal qualities of 
independence and interdependence. Independence involves the self being separate from 
context, understood as an autonomous agent who strives for uniqueness. Interdependence, by 
contrast, involves the self being intertwined with social context, understood as an agent who 
depends on others and strives for harmony. In addition to its theoretical impact, the theory 
has been applied in various fields, including personality (e.g., Ashton-James, Van Baaren, 
Chartrand, Decety, & Karremans, 2007; Baldwin & Sinclair, 1996), organizational 
psychology (e.g., Bond, 1996; Brockner, De Cremer, van den Bos, & Chen, 2005; Goncalo & 
Staw, 2006), and consumer psychology (e.g., Ahluwalia, 2008; Zhang & Shrum, 2009; Zhu 
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& Meyers-Levy, 2009). 
Despite the key role of self-construal in understanding the outcomes of self-related 
phenomena, including self-other related cognition, motivation, emotion, decision making, and 
information processing (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; van Baaren, Maddux, Chartrand, De 
Bouter, & van Knippenberg, 2003), overall understanding of self-construal itself remains 
limited. Partly for this reason, the theory has been subject to various critiques, centered on 
three issues: apparent lack of theoretical clarity, challenging empirical findings, and 
methodological issues regarding the measurement of self-construal. 
The starting point for our consideration is a question that pertains to self-construal but 
has not yet, to our knowledge, been addressed: What is the purpose of self-construal? In other 
words, why do people construe their sense of self in a way that conforms to the difference 
between independence and interdependence? Throughout our discussion, we retain and 
further develop Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) fundamental insight—self-construal orients 
on the independence and interdependence of self-perception. We however focus on which 
aspects of mind and sociality might cause self-construal to take this form. 
Aligned with this is a second question about the nature of self-construal. Prior 
research suggests that the definition of self-construal is elusive (Matsumoto, 1999; Spiro, 
1993). For example, is self-construal a kind of self-knowledge, a kind of self-process, or 
both? Our second aim is to better understand the nature of self-construal; in doing so, we 
connect what it is, in social psychological terms, to why it arises in this form. To unfold these 
questions empirically, we address a third question that has also received relatively little 
attention in the field: What are the antecedents of self-construal? Although we know what 
self-construal affects, we know little about what self-construal is affected by—for example, 
what leads people to lean toward an independent or an interdependent self-construal. 
We begin by introducing a novel Agency View of self-construal, detailing the role of 
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different modalities of self-agency, social and cultural affordances and motivations in the 
processes of the self. We then outline why and how self-construal is grounded in the role of 
self-agency by showing how different situations and motivations can shape self-agency 
assessment and result in different self-construals. Finally, we discuss the implications of the 
Agency View for understanding current debates in the field, the role of culture and 
methodological issues in self-construal research. 
We suggest that answers to these questions can help improving current understanding 
of self-construal theory, and in doing so, reconcile the apparent contradictory empirical 
findings and lessen the main theoretical and methodological criticisms of the theory. To 
reframe the concept, we pay attention to the interaction between self and culture as expressed 
in situated action, in the spirit of Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) original and subsequent 
formulations. 
Self, Agency, and Social and Cultural Affordances 
The Agency View of self-construal echoes the distinction between self-processes and 
self-knowledge (e.g., Kühnen, Hannover, & Schubert, 2001; Mead, 1934), which are 
qualitatively different in terms of awareness or conscious experience. Self-processes include 
‘I’ as a subject of consciousness, whereas self-knowledge includes ‘me’ as an object of 
consciousness: The former comprises an ‘internal’ and active sense of identity and the latter a 
more ‘external’, reflective and passive judgment or representation of that identity. Previous 
research has minimized the importance of this distinction in self-construal research, partly 
because, as suggested by Markus and Kitayama (1991, 2010) process and knowledge in self-
construal are mutually influencing. 
A way to address this question is to understand how people ascribe self-agency — 
how people experience the sense that an action is theirs, that ‘I’ is the cause of that action 
(Decety & Sommerville, 2003). We first identify key aspects of this competence and then 
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relate it to two additional issues that aid in the reframing of self-construal: social and cultural 
affordances and evolved, adaptive motivations. We suggest that self-construal involves a way 
of ascribing self-agency that uses particular social and cultural affordances of the self that are 
most salient to actions closely derived from evolved, adaptive motivations. 
Self-Agency 
The question of self-reference – especially in the context of language and self-
awareness – humans’ capacity for self-introspection - has been a topic of interest to 
philosophers, both in the traditional (e.g. Descartes, 1637/1965; Locke, 1689/1975) and 
modern philosophy literature (e.g. Shoemaker, 1968). As philosophers Bayne (2008), 
Gallagher (2000, 2007), and Pacherie (2008) note, the awareness of self-agency is 
psychologically complex, even if it feels subjectively indivisible. Social psychologists, on the 
other hand, have focused on characterizing the relations between the personal dimensions of 
the self (e.g. individual personality, Costa & McCrae, 1988) from the social elements of the 
self (e.g. social identity, Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). Findings from psychology and 
neuropsychology (e.g., Balconi, 2010; David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008; Knoblich & Repp, 
2009; Sato, 2009; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008) and philosophy (e.g., Gallagher, 
2000, 2007; Pacherie, 2008) suggests that the sense of self-agency may have three ‘levels’ or 
modalities, each supported by its own type of process. The first - we term this implicit self-
agency - is an implicit experience or feeling, where prereflective processes draw on efferent 
feedback from sensorimotor states related to bodily movements (e.g., Haggard, Clark, & 
Kalogeras, 2002) and on perceptual information of (changes in) the state of world affairs 
(e.g., Bayne & Pacherie, 2007; Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Gallagher, 2007). This 
indicates that ‘I’ was the cause of the action but does not offer an explanation of what the 
action might be, the reasons for performing it, or what others might think of it. Such matters 
are the provinces of another modality - we will call this explicit self-agency. This is a largely 
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explicit or reflective judgment of agency, which minimally indicates an awareness of or 
explicit attribution to who caused an action to occur; this may extend to complex 
explanations of the action in terms of personal short- or long-term intentions, narratives of the 
self, culturally laden beliefs about action and behavior, and so on. Indeed, higher-order 
attribution or judgment of self-agency may take as inputs the results of the lower-order 
implicit sense of self-agency (e.g., Synofzik et al., 2008; for related views, see Lambie & 
Marcel, 2002; Legrand & Ruby, 2009). Moreover, Northoff, Qin, and Feinberg (2011) 
suggest that between the sensorimotor-based prereflective sense of self and the more 
obviously cognitive or reflective sense of self, there may also be self-related processing, 
which does not entail the form of conscious self-awareness or judgment involved in self-
referential, reflective processing. Such self-agency – which we call intermediate self-agency 
– may involve composing complex plans and actions from less complex ones (knowing that a 
complex action can be performed depends on prior knowledge of self-agency for some or all 
of its component actions) but does not, in itself, require conscious awareness of that agency. 
Thus, there may be three modalities of self-agency awareness: the implicit, lower 
modality of the sense of self-agency; the intermediate modality of self-related information 
about self-agency, and the explicit, higher modality of self-agency judgment (see Footnote 2). 
Self-construal, we suggest, takes the assessment of self-agency as input and elaborates it in 
terms of information about the individual’s access to power (as the cultural elaboration of 
agency), and terms of broader cultural norms for action (see Figure 1). 
A variety of process models for the sense of self-agency has been offered (for 
reviews, see David et al., 2008; Pacherie, 2008; Pockett, Banks, & Gallagher, 2006; Roessler 
& Eilan, 2003). Our conceptualization of self-construal draws on two of their common 
qualities. First, determining self-agency involves implicitly or explicitly assessing the 
congruence between information about anticipated outcomes/events and about actual 
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outcomes/situations. A sense of agency can be inferred from congruence between an action 
and an actually preexisting thought or intention, or a retrospectively confabulated ‘memory’ 
of such a thought based on expectations or norms (Wegner, 2002, 2005). 
The second is that this assessment combines an array of cues, from environmental 
cues and high-level knowledge, to prior action-relevant thoughts or intentions and associated 
perceptual information, to sensorimotor cues in the form of efferent and reafferant 
information (David et al., 2008). Pacherie (2008; see also Wheeler, 2005) suggests the array 
of cues can be distilled into three types of intention and associated information. These map 
onto the modalities of self-agency: the explicit self-agency expresses ‘distal’ intentions, 
where the action’s intended outcome and means are specified in belief- and culture-laden 
cognitive terms; the implicit self-agency expresses ‘motor’ intentions, where the goal and 
means are given in sensorimotor terms; and the intermediate self-agency expresses 
‘proximal’ intentions, given in action–perceptual terms (the action types to be implemented 
and the perceptual events that follow). Thus, three modalities of self-agency ascription are 
represented in different mental formats, each with their own characteristic form of intention. 
Wegner’s (2002, 2005) observation indicates the flexibility in recruiting and using 
cues. Cues of all types might all indicate the same conclusion, whereby the ‘I’ is the ‘author’ 
of the action (i.e., there is evidence for self-agency). Cues of different types might also 
indicate different conclusions, for example, sensorimotor and perceptual information may 
suggest self-agency, but prior beliefs about past experience or cultural norms and prohibitions 
suggest other-agency or joint-agency. For example, someone who signs both their own and 
their partner’s signature on a contract, when their partner is unavailable (though willing) to 
sign: the implicit and intermediate level indicate self-agency, but the explicit level requires 
joint agency; since the partner is believed to have been willing to sign had they been 
available, this allows the agent to reinterpret this illegal action as a more minor issue. This 
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forms the basis of our proposal: different types of self-construal may emerge from different 
patterns over the three types of information. 
Social and Cultural Affordances and Self-Agency 
Affordances are relations linking mind and situation by possible action–perception 
connections (Gibson, 1977, 1986;  Turvey & Shaw, 1979; Wells, 2002): to perceive an aspect 
of the environment is to directly detect opportunities for action. Affordances are not 
‘subjectively imposed’ on the environment by an agent, nor do they exist in that environment 
independent of any agent. Perception and action form an interdependent cycle, motivating 
action without conscious mental representations of the relevant aspect of the environment 
(Richardson, Shockley, Fajen, Riley, & Turvey, 2008). Affordances inhabit the intermediate 
level of representation (Dreyfus, 1985; Franks, 2011) — neither wholly implicit nor explicit. 
In certain circumstances affordances might become the object of explicit thought, but more 
usually (e.g., when the action type succeeds), they are more likely to remain implicit.  
Intermediate self-agency involves affordances related to the self, in particular regarding 
combination of component actions into more complex patterns without conscious awareness 
(reflecting the structuring of affordances in ‘niches’: Gibson 1977; Shaw & Turvey, 1981). 
This is consistent with increasingly influential philosophical and psychological views of the 
relationship between mind and context (see Footnote 3). These views agree that many mental 
states simultaneously comprise ‘descriptive’ representations of a situation, plus more 
‘embodied’ affective or motivational states that evaluate and prompt action towards it (see 
Franks, 2011, chapters 5 & 6), as in affordances. 
Crucially, other people both provide and modulate affordances. What the environment 
affords an individual may depend on other people or groups that are present or engaged in 
actions that interleave with the action of that individual; and this combines with what the 
environment (including the individual) affords those others (e.g., Richardson et al., 2008). An 
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individual carrying a large piece of wood, for example, experiences affordances based on 
their own capacities; but if another person helps, those affordances are modulated by their 
qualities (e.g., if they are stronger it can be carried more easily), or different actions afforded 
(if they are much stronger, more pieces could be carried at once). Much action is social: one 
person’s sense of agency can depend on their perception (and the reality) of other peoples’ 
agency regarding an action or regarding actions on which their own action depends. 
Moreover, for many socially significant actions, the cultural (rather than ecological) 
environment generates action potentials, again without peoples necessarily being consciously 
aware of this. Cultural affordances may arise when culturally produced artifacts generate 
physical affordances (e.g., Nisbett & Masuda, 2003); or culture may motivate shared 
attention to already existing affordances (e.g., Miyamoto, Nisbett, & Masuda, 2006; Valenti 
& Gold, 1991); or it may create the affordances, leading to normatively preferred actions 
(e.g., Loveland, 1991).  Cultural affordances can operate even if another person or group 
upon whom an individual’s agency depends is not physically present. As long those others 
are reliably connected (in memory or imagination) to cues in the situation, norms and their 
associated affordances and actions can be elicited (Chemero, 2003; Derbyshire, Ellis & 
Tucker, 2006; Osiurak, Jarry & LeGall, 2010). For example, cultures vary in normatively 
sanctioned affordances for responding to insults: some cultures motivate a first response of 
conciliation, whilst others motivate one of conflict escalation (e.g., Wierzbicka, 2003). 
 The simplest model of self-agency ascription would be a direct correspondence 
between cue type and modality, so that sensorimotor cues alone would lead to the ‘feel’ of 
self-agency (implicit self-agency), perceptual cues alone to self-related self-agency 
(intermediate self-agency), and belief and contextual cues to conscious self-agency (explicit 
self-agency). A more complex view (consistent with Wegner’s suggestion, 2002, 2005) is 
that the different types of cue can enter into each of the three modalities. We suggest that this 
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– and in particular ‘higher’ belief and contextual cues aligned to explicit self-agency actually 
entering into intermediate self-agency ascription – is central to self-construal. Assessing 
agency involves assessing congruence between expected and actual states of affairs resulting 
from action, which requires both perceptual and cultural information; this leads to a crucial 
role for social and cultural affordances. 
Culture is distributed diffusely in the environment and detected by ongoing 
interaction with it – eliciting implicit and affordance level (as well as conscious) knowledge 
and associated actions. As Markus and Kitayama (2003), Kitayama and Imada (2008), and 
others suggest, cultures may have different affordances eliciting different actions in similar 
situations (e.g., relatively automatic dispositions to conform to or resist authority). They may 
also differ in the degree of contingency in eliciting affordances that are common across 
cultures (Morling & Lamoreaux, 2008 discuss situational measures of cultural affordances). 
Crucially for self-construal, affordances express norms governing actions for which agency is 
prescribed and proscribed for individuals, contributing to self-agency assessment. 
Past accounts have connected affordances with the self (see Gibson, 1994; Gibson, 
1977). However, Neisser (1988) and Loveland (1991) sharply differentiate aspects of self that 
are subject to affordances (‘lower’ levels), from those subject to cultural effects (‘higher’, 
fully explicit levels). We propose instead that cultural expectations for the specific action 
impacts on all three Modalities of assessing agency for that action. Assessing agency at all 
levels involves assessing congruence between expected and actual states of affairs resulting 
from action, and those expectations are partly defined by culture. 
Adaptive Motivations, Cultural Affordances and Self-Agency 
Evolutionary approaches to psychology have developed different perspectives on how 
mental capacities are connected to reproductive success and inclusive fitness of those who 
possess them. For some (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1992) they result in special –purpose 
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modules that are ‘designed’ to perform relevant functions; for others (e.g., Richerson & 
Boyd, 2005) they result in more flexible capacities for social learning which are attuned to 
particular aspects of the learning environment (e.g., role model qualities).  The motivations 
that we consider are flexible in that the other people and social contexts in which they are 
satisfied depend heavily on socialization. Gibson (1977, p. 135) suggested that many 
affordances reflect evolved social threats and opportunities  (see also Kaufmann & Clément, 
2007; Neisser, 1988): ‘Sexual behavior, nurturing behavior, fighting behavior, cooperative 
behavior, economic behavior, political behavior – all depend on the perceiving of what 
another person or other persons afford, or sometimes on the misperceiving of it’. 
Such motivations would generate different specific actions relevant to different 
persons, situations, and cultures. As Kenrick, Neuberg, Griskevicius, Becker, and Schaller 
(2008) note, both insults and scorpions can elicit approach or avoidance, depending on 
context and personal and adaptive reasons. The ascription of self-agency for avoidance of 
each, for example, would recruit different information as cues. Griskevicius et al. (2009) 
therefore suggest a more fine-grained fundamental motive, each of which has opportunities 
and threats, many of which are social in nature – including self-protection, affiliation, 
esteem/status, mate acquisition and retention, and parenting. 
Such adaptive motivations relate to self-agency in at least three ways relevant to our 
view. First, achieving positive self-valuation (proposed as an evolved adaptation by 
Sedikides, Skowronski, & Dunbar, 2006) seems directly connected to recurrent experience of 
self-agency in fulfilling important motives. Second, the expression of these motivations, their 
means of satisfaction by action, and the criteria for success and failure, depends on cultural 
norms. For example, cultures vary in opportunities for interacting with potential mates 
(different signals of availability, encouragement, and so on) and in threats and punishments 
for inappropriate behavior. Thus the affordances connected to such adaptive motivations, are 
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cultural affordances. Third, assessments of self-agency regarding adaptive motivations need 
not always - or consistently - be accurate, especially where positive self-valuation is 
important. This has consequences for the dynamics of self-construal, to which we return 
below. 
Towards a Better Understanding of the Processes of Self-Construal via Self-Agency and 
Social and Cultural Affordances 
Self-agency thus appears to have three modalities or degrees of explicitness: a 
‘feeling’ (implicit self-agency), a ‘judgment’ (explicit self-agency), and an intermediate 
‘perception’ (intermediate self-agency).  All play an important role in the sense of self, and 
interact with cultural settings, via social and cultural affordances. A particularly important 
class of actions regarding self-agency derives from adaptive motivations, whose satisfaction 
depends on cultural norms, and therefore raises questions of positive self-valuation and self-
deception regarding self-agency. In this section, we look at the ways in which self-agency can 
lead to the formation of different types of dominant self-construals, and consider the potential 
moderating role of social and cultural affordances. 
The Relation Between Self-agency and the Independent and Interdependent Self-
Construal 
Next we turn to the relations between agency assessment and the different forms of 
self-construal. A specific self-construal regarding a particular action or situation emerges 
from the assessment of agency via the combination of the three kinds of modalities 
previously introduced. Cues of broadly one kind might point towards independent self-
construal for that action, and cues of another kind might point towards interdependent self-
construal. 
Starting with implicit self-agency - the sensorimotor cues (the ‘feel’ of an action) and 
motor intentions associated with implicit self-agency - independent self-construal would be 
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suggested if the intended outcomes of the physical movements match the ones that are 
sensed, and do not depend on another person. For instance, a person’s motor intention to pick 
up a pen from a desk would be a simple case. By contrast, interdependent self-construal 
would be suggested if the match between motor intentions and outcomes essentially depends 
on the motor movements of another person. Picking up a pen which is out of reach and needs 
to be pushed across the desk by another person, for example. A particular class of actions that 
have received attention recently are cases of the emergence of synchrony in joint action – 
where one person’s motor behavior is interlaced that of another person, with the outcome that 
their actions are synchronized without any explicit plan or communication (e.g., Kirschner & 
Tomasello, 2009, on children’s synchronized behavior in drumming together). Here the 
motor cues to agency would point towards interdependence rather than independence. 
At intermediate self-agency level, the cues concern affordances providing perceptual 
information on the achievement of intended actions that may be components of more 
complex action-plans. For independence, the sense of self-agency arises from perceiving that 
an action has made a change that allows the next step to be taken, where this has arisen from 
one’s own actions alone. Filling the pen with ink before writing would be a simple case: 
perceptual feedback would provide cues of autonomous action. By contrast, interdependence 
would involve perceiving that an action has made a change that allows the next step to be 
taken by the individual, but where this is perceived to have arisen from either another 
person’s or group’s actions or from a joint action. One person holding the pen upright whilst 
the other pours ink from a bottle would be an example. The interleaving of component 
proximal intentions via perceptual information about outcomes in such joint action has been 
investigated in a variety of ways (e.g., Knoblich, Butterfill & Sebanz, 2011; Richardson et al, 
2008). The outcome is ascription of agency to the individual in conjunction with others – 
interdependent self-construal resulting from conjoint agency. 
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At explicit self-agency level, the cues relate to patterns of descriptive, prescriptive and 
proscriptive norms and social organizations governing agency. These are the kinds of cultural 
patterns that have been extensively discussed by Markus and Kitayama and others scholars. 
For independence, they indicate situations and actions for which an individual is expected to 
be an autonomous agent (e.g., where the writing task assumes personal authority – such as a 
signature). For interdependence, they indicate ones for which agency is to be expressed in the 
service of or jointly together with others’ goals (e.g., where the writing task assumes shared 
authority – such as a game of ‘hangman’ or ‘tic tac toe’). For still others, they indicate cases 
where the group is expected to take causal precedence (i.e., not expected to experience self-
agency at all). 
The Dynamic Aspects of the Self-Agency - Self-Construal Relationship 
The Agency View, illustrated on Figure 1, also offers three sources of dynamics in the 
relation between cultural norms and self-construal based on agency assessment. The first is 
that agency and self-construal are defined here for a specific action, situation and time. 
Where a form of self-construal recurs, it may become a dominant self-construal for that 
individual. However, there is no starting assumption that self-construal will always tend to 
match cultural expectations. The second and third concern the individual being active in 
‘negotiating’ self-construal on the basis of agency, via two different kinds of ‘dialogues’. 
The first dialogue involves mismatches between assessments at different modalities. 
For example, the sense of agency arising from implicit self-agency or intermediate self-
agency (affordances) may conflict with explicit self-agency’s norms about appropriateness of 
that agency; the former might be (re)assessed on the basis of the latter, or the formation of the 
latter altered according to the former. In Figure 1, this is expressed by the arrows looping 
back from explicit self-agency to implicit and intermediate self-agency. This is an important 
basis for flexibility in self-construal: which modality takes precedence seems likely to depend 
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on the nature of the action, its connection to the individual’s positive self-valuation, and the 
strength of associated cultural norms. 
Motivated mismatches between modalities might, as noted above, be prompted by 
preserving positive self-valuation - which may be an evolved motivation, as previously 
discussed. This echoes Wegner’s (2002) suggestion of confabulation, and can be further 
underpinned by evolutionary accounts of self-deception (e.g., Trivers, 2011). Not being 
aware of one’s true motivations (or denying them) may enhance chances of successfully 
deceiving others, which may increase probability of successfully satisfying adaptive 
motivations (especially when success depends on competing with others). Self-deception may 
arise in assessing self-agency for actions that contradict cultural norms, contradicting the 
implicit and intermediate ascriptions of self-agency so as to conform to the norms and 
maintain a culturally appropriate and positively valued self-construal. More broadly, explicit 
self-agency may promote self-enhancement or self-criticism on different parameters (see 
Heine, Kitayama, & Hamamura, 2007; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005), and mismatches 
may also help explain divergent findings on implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem 
(Heine & Hamamura, 2007; Kitayama & Uchida, 2003). 
The second ‘dialogue’ supports dynamic effects arising from social interaction - 
within intermediate self-agency (affordances). Many actions necessarily involve an agent’s 
affordances depending on the behavior of another person or group and their affordances (and 
on how the other’s affordances modulate the agent’s affordances). This may involve being 
aware of the other’s habitual or dominant self-construal, indicating how they typically act in 
concert with others and whether and how the agent can rely on them.  Especially in cases 
where the action fails - or succeeds beyond the usual norm - an implicit ‘dialogue’ may arise 
between the affordances of the agent and the agent’s perception of the other. This would then 
influence intermediate self-agency agency assessment, that is, those cultural norms will guide 
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interpretation of the other’s affordances. In Figure 1, this is expressed by the arrows looping 
between self-related affordances and others’ affordances for intermediate self-agency. This 
dialogue will often confirm the agent’s dominant self-construal, perhaps when the other 
shares that self-construal, or the action is routine and successful. But where their dominant 
self-construals diverge, or the action’s success seems threatened or conspicuously improved 
by the other, the dialogue may have more dynamic consequences for the agent’s current self-
construal – and perhaps for future repetitions of the action type. As a result, the agent’s self-
construal may emphasize differences or similarities relative to the other, depending on the 
affordances and how they connect to the success of the action. 
These two forms of dialogue may also interact (see Figure 1). Consider the 
consequences of the recent financial crisis for consumer behavior. Consumers deposit their 
money based on cultural affordances that makes them interdependent on the bank’s 
investment strategies, which they presume will not threaten their deposits - i.e., consumers’ 
interdependence seems to assume the bankers’ interdependence. But the financial crisis (i.e., 
the threat to the success of the consumers’ actions), arguably made consumers more aware of 
the other affordances of bankers and aware that they are rewarded for independence, not 
interdependence. In order to try to regain control of the outcomes of their financial actions, 
many consumers entertained actions with more independent self-agency (e.g., checking bank 
account statements more carefully, moving money to bodies with more interdependent 
practices, etc.). Hence, being aware of the self-construal perspective of the other in an 
intermediate self-agency dialogue can lead an agent to change their own self-construal 
regarding a type of action so as to promote its future success.  These attempts might generate 
a more independent explicit self-agency assessment (and associated self-construal for these 
actions), perhaps to provide a positive self-valuation from a sense of personal efficacy. But 
this would remain at odds with the interdependent agency that continue to be required in 
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consumer banking, reflected in the intermediate self-agency assessment. The outcome of such 
a dialogue between explicit, implicit and intermediate self-agency for self-construal and 
future action, is presumably something that an agent arrives at on a case-by-case basis. And 
the grounds upon which they do so are an empirical matter. 
The role of Power, Social and Cultural Affordances in the Agency View of Self-
construal 
Several variables from an individual’s social and cultural environment are likely to 
play a role in the expression of self-agency and the formation of self-construal (see Figure 1). 
The first and probably most important one is individual power. Traditional definitions of 
power link the self - and the sense of agency - to others. For instance, Lewin and Cartwright 
(1951) define power as the capacity of an agent to influence or stay un-influenced from 
others. Magee, Galinsky, and Gruenfeld’s characterization is more extensive: “the capacity to 
control one’s own and others’ resources and outcomes” (2007, p. 201). Few works in 
psychology have looked at the potential relation between self-construal and power. Lee and 
Tiedens (2001) hinted at a possible connection between power and self-construal, and, more 
recently, empirical and theoretical work further corroborated this relation (Voyer & Reader, 
2013; Voyer & McIntosh, 2013). 
Following Voyer and McIntosh (2013), power can be related to self-agency given its 
effects on individual perception and cognition and on social interaction - that is, principally 
via intermediate self-agency (social affordances). Power can both modulate the expression of 
one’s own affordances (e.g., encouraging or limiting performance of the relevant actions), as 
well as one’s perception of another’s affordances (e.g., making it more or less likely that one 
will perceive those affordances). Guinote (2007) suggested that power changes decrease the 
processing of peripheral information, which is not relevant to goals and needs (of the kind 
connected to affordances), and Anderson and Galinsky (2006) that individuals with power are 
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more focused on their own internal states. Support for a role of power in the relation between 
other-related affordances and self-agency can also be found in the works of Keltner et al. , 
2001, who suggest that power affects the type of emotional connections that individuals 
develop with others, or Regan and Totten (1975) who suggest that powerful individuals do 
not use the same type of empathy strategies as those without power. Finally, work by 
Goodwin, Operario, and Fiske (1998) identified different impression formation strategies for 
high power vs low power individuals. 
Power may also modulate motivations that connect to self-agency.  Fiske and Fiske 
(2007) for instance suggested that power affects core social motives that drive individual 
behaviors. This could result in powerful individuals favoring motivations such as self-
enhancement - which could affect independent self-construal (as well as self-deception over 
responsibility for counter-normative actions) - over relationship enhancement – which could 
affect interdependent self-construal. Finally, perspective taking could also be one of the 
mechanisms through which power moderates the effect of others’ affordances on self-agency 
and self-construal – as in the example of bank consumers (above). According to Davis, 
Conklin, Smith, & Luce (1996), perspective taking is a key mechanism used by humans to 
adapt to their social environment. Perspective taking also probably plays an important role in 
the two types of internal dialogue previously discussed. 
The role of power in the relation between self-agency and self-construal can be 
further moderated by a series of more general social and cultural affordances (see Figure 1). 
For instance, Lammers and Galinsky (2009) argue that Western culture foster an association 
of power with independence, whereas Eastern cultures foster an association of power with 
interdependence. Magee, Zhong, Galinsky, and Maddux (2010) also note that the expression 
of power differs across cultures, and that, in collectivist cultures, individuals with high levels 
of power are expected to use their power in a responsible manner - that is, caring for the 
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consequences of their actions on the powerless. 
Our view is that - at least as regards its connection to agency and self-construal - 
gender has a similar role to power. Gender roles can be understood in part as involving a set 
of social and cultural affordances that regulate not only individual action but also social 
interaction.  Our suggestion is that these affordances influence the exercise of power in social 
relations, so that gender influences self-agency assessment only indirectly via its influence on 
power when it has a connection with the specific action under consideration. As with other 
cultural variables, gender also more generally moderates the interpretation of self-agency in 
the formation of self-construal (see Cross & Madson, 1997). 
Our discussions of power and gender illustrate a key aspect of the Agency View: 
culture has an influence at two points in the process of self-construal based on self-agency. 
The first is a ‘local’ effect of specific norms associated with affordances and explicit beliefs 
connected to the specific action whose agency is being assessed (in Figure 1, the elements 
that enter into self-agency assessment). The second is a ‘global’ effect of more general norms 
and beliefs that are not tied to specific actions (or affordances not associated with the specific 
actions whose agency is being assessed on this occasion), but which concern, for example, 
roles, gender and broad cultural models for patterns of activity (in Figure 1, the elements that 
moderate the relationship between self-agency assessment and self-construal).  Power has 
both kinds of effect: it moderates the interaction between agent and other and so influences 
the expression of specific affordances in the assessment of self-agency; but it also connects to 
more general norms and models that moderate the way in which self-construal builds on that 
agency assessment. |Gender, we suggest, has an indirect effect on self-agency assessment via 
its impact on power, but it has a direct moderating effect on the relation between self-agency 
and self-construal. Other cultural variables may have an effect on the relation between self-
agency and self-construal, but not directly on self-agency itself. 
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Discussion 
Answering the ‘why’ question for self-construal thus takes us through self-agency 
assessment. We argue that self-construal is an important aspect of the sense of self because it 
systematizes general cultural expectations and tendencies that enter into a cyclical process 
with the assessment of self-agency, which itself draws on evolved dispositions. In addition, 
self-construal takes the form of independence versus interdependence precisely because 
assessments of self-agency offer two ways of affirming self-agency (self-agency of the 
individual and self-agency in relation to others). In light of our conceptualization of the 
Agency View, we first discuss how this connects with other approaches concerned with self-
construal, and then consider its relations to culture, before discussing methodological 
consequences and implications for future research. 
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The Agency View and Other Accounts of Self-Construal 
The close connection between self-construal, agency and motivation, which we 
introduced here, aligns with past accounts of self-construal theory (Markus and Kitayama 
1991, 2010; see also Heine, 2007, 2010). The novelty of our perspective concerns the locus 
and origin of this connection. For Markus and Kitayama, agency and motivation are 
primarily consequences of self-construal (see Figure 1). Regarding motivation – peoples’ 
goals people and characteristic ways of approaching them – Kitayama, Duffy, and Uchida 
(2007) suggest that independence enshrines a principle of goal-directedness, whereas 
interdependence enshrines a principle of responsiveness to social contingencies. These 
cultural normative principles evaluate actions arising from forms of self-construal, which 
depends on prior assessment of agency for those actions. Regarding agency, Markus and 
Kitayama (2003, p. 4; see also Kitayama & Imada, 2008) suggest interdependent self-
construal connects to a model of ‘conjoint’ agency, which ‘is constructed as relational, as 
jointly afforded and manifest in adjusting to particular others’ (p. 44), while independence 
prompts a model of ‘disjoint’ agency in which ‘actions affirm and realize a relatively 
independent self’ (p. 43). Again, normative models of agency arise from cultural forms of 
self-construal, which depends on prior agency ascription. 
We concur with Markus and Kitayama’s view, but suggest that it offers only a partial 
picture in relating more to knowledge, models of agency or action regulation than to the 
process of determining one’s own sense of agency. Our view is that the process of agency 
assessment is integral to the process of self-construal, such that agency and motivation are 
important antecedents and consequences of self-construal, in a cyclical process. This engages 
not only cultural cues but also sensorimotor and perceptual ones, in a process whose origin is 
partly in evolved motivations (concerning self-valuation and self-deception, plus fundamental 
social motives). 
SELF-CONSTRUAL THEORY: AN AGENCY VIEW  23 
 
Viewing self-agency as an antecedent (as well as a consequence) of self-construal, 
leads us to different perspectives on a range of ideas concerned with how the self connects to 
others. We note three. First, Lee and Tiedens (2001) suggest that someone might be 
relationally relatively independent (i.e., have few close ties) but, as a consequence, view 
themself as interdependent on those few people. On our view, this would reflect the mismatch 
between an explicit assessment of independent agency (leading to an independent self-
construal) and the assessment of interdependent agency at implicit and intermediate levels. 
Self-agency may be more or less independent even if self-construal is interdependent. 
Second, the Agency View echoes important ideas concerning how someone’s sense of 
self relates to a group of which they are a member. For interdependent agency, implicit self-
agency involves the ‘feel’ or ‘sense’ that another’s actions are intrinsically intertwined with 
one’s own, and intermediate self-agency involves the perception that another’s affordances 
and one’s own are dynamically intertwined (so that one’s own affordances evoke affordances 
in the other, and the affordances of the other then modulate one’s own affordances). This 
echoes Swann et al’s (2012) concept of ‘identity fusion’, a visceral, felt sense of oneness 
(including agency) with another person or group, which is prototypically expressed in family 
relations but can expand to larger groups. Swann et al. (2012) make the important point that 
being fused with a group does not entail complete immersion of all thought and emotion in 
that group; it does not involve ‘substituting’ a ‘social self’ for a personal or individual self 
(unlike, arguably, Social Identity Theory: Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). This is particularly 
important for agency: fusion does not preclude an individual sense of agency that is separate 
from the group or that allows creative, individual ways of achieving group goals. The Agency 
View suggests that this might arise from a mismatch between interdependent agency 
assessments at implicit and intermediate self-agency, with independence at explicit self-
agency. 
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Third, the Agency View also clarifies a possible process for building content in self-
construal. Woike (1994) proposed processes of self ‘integration’ and ‘differentiation’. 
Differentiation makes individuals see more differences than similarities between their self 
and others, whilst integration reverses this. We suggest that self-construal generates this 
contrast partly because of different self-agency assessments. Recurrently assessing the self 
alone as the agent for actions eventually leads to a larger set of memories of actions and 
situations with the self as focus for the differentiation process to draw on; and recurrently 
assessing agency as conjoint will lead to more memories in which self and others are 
intertwined, inputting to integration. Hannover, Birkner, and Pöhlmann (2006) note that 
independent self-construal produces ‘autonomous’ self-knowledge (e.g., traits and attitudes), 
derived, we suggest, from inferences about types of autonomous actions or the situations in 
which they arise; interdependent self-construal produces ‘social’ self-knowledge (e.g., group 
memberships), derived from inferences for social groups with whom agency is reliably 
intertwined. 
The Role of Culture in the Agency View of Self-Construal 
One of the key challenges for self-construal theory has been to solve the puzzle of the 
large degree of variation in self-construal within cultures, given that culture is a main cause 
of self-construal. The Agency View offers a novel perspective to this. We perceive 
affordances as combining to form complex ‘niches’, which are sets of normatively framed 
ways of acting connected with recurrent situation types (see Laland, Odling-Smee and 
Feldman, 2000, for an elaboration of the concept of a ‘niche’ as a repository of cultural and 
ecological constraints that scaffold action and can lead to evolutionary adaptation). Some 
kinds of situations might together constitute a niche if they exhibit mutually sustaining 
affordances, for example, based on institutional patterns (e.g., places of work, of leisure, of 
education). Other types of niche — perhaps ones predominantly related to satisfying adaptive 
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motivations — are likely to crosscut situations (e.g., a ‘mate attraction’ niche, comprising the 
cultural affordances related to attracting a mate, may be distributed across different situations 
and institutional types; see Franks, 2014). 
This picture inverts the notion that cultures comprise mutually reinforcing sets of 
consistent ideas, practices, and artifacts, allied to a large group or even nation; it therefore 
contradicts the expectation that a whole nation/culture comprises antecedents that 
consistently connect self-construal with independence or interdependence. Instead, the 
possibility of mutually reinforcing and mutually contradictory affordance niches prompts 
attention to the details of interactions with specific kinds of contexts. Thus, the rather small 
effect sizes for correlations between a whole nation/culture and self-construal are 
unsurprising (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Such findings may be understood as 
expressions of abstractions or aggregations over an array of niches, which individually 
prompt different self-construals. If investigations focused on specific niches, we would 
predict larger effect sizes, though they might not all connect with independence or 
interdependence because different niches impose different behavioral demands. Attention to 
context therefore suggests a search for within-cultural or within-national variations, in line 
with critiques of cross-cultural psychology (Matsumoto, 1999, Ratner, & Hui, 2003, 
Schwartz, 1990; Shweder, & Sullivan, 1993). 
Our view also differs from other solutions to how large degrees of within-cultural 
variation in self-construal can arise even within a culture that might be thought to have a 
single, dominant form of self-construal. Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, and Uskul 
(2009) offer a three-level view, starting with the abstract formulation of a culture’s explicit 
‘cultural mandate’ (e.g., to be interdependent); this can be reflected in a range of more 
specific ‘cultural tasks’, which are culturally prescribed complex patterns of behavior and 
thinking that help achieve the mandates (e.g., to be self-effacing, to have honor and respect); 
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those tasks themselves can be achieved by a range of (often implicit) specific ‘psychological 
tendencies’ (e.g., tendency toward situational attribution, toward engaging in other-focused 
emotions). Different individuals typically possess only some of the relevant psychological 
tendencies and perform only some of the cultural tasks, so that they will not fulfill the 
cultural mandate to the same degree - giving scope for intra-cultural variations. Such 
variations would then produce low correlations between measures of the explicit cultural 
mandate and cultural tasks/psychological tendencies. 
This is an elegant solution to a complex problem, though it may not go far enough in 
contemplating within-cultural variability, for three main reasons. First if, as suggested above, 
niches cross-cut each other, then different psychological tendencies might not only correlate 
positively with each other but could contradict each other. Second, focusing on the 
connection between psychological tendencies, tasks and culture overlooks the prior issue of 
ascribing agency for actions connected with psychological tendencies and cultural tasks. If 
ascribed agency mismatches with cultural expectations, then the performance of those actions 
simply cannot confirm the cultural mandate (on that occasion), even if ordinarily there is a 
strong correlation between the action and the mandate. Third, it does not address the 
possibility of motivated mismatches between cultural norms and psychological processes , 
such as in self-deception. However, in line with our proposal to link self-construal to agency 
via evolutionary motivations, Kitayama, King, Yoon, Tompson, Huff and  Liberzon  (2014) 
offer the intriguing possibility that such mismatches could in part be explained by gene-
culture interactions – people who inherit specific genetic variants that motivate greater 
responsiveness to social rewards (in the brain’s uptake of dopamine) appear less likely to act 
in ways that generate mismatches with cultural norms regarding self-agency. The Agency 
View does thus not contradict cultural task theory, but consolidates such scope for a more 
active – dynamic and dialogical – relation between an individual, their actions and cultural 
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norms. Context dependence is more complex than an individual selecting from a range of 
options; it also generates new options via the dynamic interchange of perspectives and 
associated affordances in social interaction: Culture encompasses contradictions and 
contestations between individuals and within individuals. We view such apparent self-
contradictions in self-construal as underpinned by consistent questions and processes 
regarding self-agency. 
The complex nature of context dependence of self-construal is important because 
individuals use and need both types of self-construals (Imamoglu, 2003; Baumeister & Leary, 
1995; Kagitçibasi, 2005); we suggest that this is because self-agency and adaptive social 
relations necessarily involve both autonomy and relatedness (Blanton & Christie, 2003; 
Guisinger & Blatt, 1994). 
SELF-CONSTRUAL THEORY: AN AGENCY VIEW  28 
 
The Agency View and Methodological Issues in Self-Construal Research 
There are several different implications of the Agency View for empirical research on 
self-construal and connected variables. The first is the overarching suggestion that research 
should pay more detailed attention to the specifics of social situations and actions, and their 
connections to self-agency and self-construal.  
If culture, and in particular cultural affordances regarding agency, needs to be 
assessed in a fine-grained way, this suggests a shift to a more pluralistic methodological 
approach. Typically, research on self-construal involves the use of questionnaires to tap into 
individuals’ explicit views of themselves, and investigates explanatory connections between 
variables by correlational techniques. An arguably more appropriate measure of the process 
of self-construal is the IOS (Inclusion of Other Scale: Aron et al., 1991; Aron et al., 1992). 
However, this scale assumes that different self-construals are bipolar opposites, which 
contradicts Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) assumption that independent and interdependent 
self-construals are statistically independent, which underpins the vital possibility that an 
individual can be simultaneously independent and interdependent. This plea for 
methodological pluralism is consistent with Markus and Kitayama (1998), Kitayama (2002), 
Kanagawa, Cross, and Markus (2001), and Matsumoto (1999), who argue that questionnaires 
may not be the most appropriate measure for self-construal in collectivist settings. We argue 
that they may also not be appropriate in the West, at least for some important aspects of self-
construal - in particular, those that are closely coupled to implicit self-agency assessments of 
self-agency or to intermediate self-agency (affordances) (cf. below).  
Regarding other methods, Matsumoto (1999) called for qualitative methods to provide 
a more nuanced understanding of the local cultural expressions of self-construal.  However, 
like questionnaires, most qualitative methods are restricted to explicit self-agency 
(‘judgment’) — expressible verbally as explicit knowledge in, for example, a semi-structured 
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interview. Though valuable in its own right, it lacks insight into the other modalities of the 
sense of self-agency. Because self-construal is, by turns, a cause and consequence of 
Modalities 1 and 2 of self-agency, explicit verbal tasks simply fail to tap into a range of 
important self-construal phenomena. 
This leads to the second implication of the Agency View for methodological issues: 
the importance of Modalities 1 and 2 to self-construal suggests several different directions for 
measurement, which would be complementary to explicit, verbal methods. One is the use of 
non-verbal methods. For example, recall the comments on identity fusion theory, above. 
Since fusion involves implicit agency interdependence, the pictorial or diagrammatic 
measures of degrees of identity fusion used as dependent measures by Swann et al (2012), 
could also be used as an indicator of degree of implicit interdependent agency (implicit self-
agency). To assess self-agency at intermediate self-agency level, fine-grained experimental 
methods designed to tap into perception–action–self-agency–self-construal cycles could be 
used, contrasting the sequences that arise for actions that require conjoint agency with actions 
that do not; such methods have been used in work on affordances in ecological (and, more 
recently, embodied) social psychology (e.g., Richardson et al, 2008); their connection with 
self-construal is yet to be exploited. Other appropriate methods are experimental techniques 
that tap into implicit, nonconscious beliefs about the self, in parallel to the important work on 
implicit attitudes (see Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). For example, the degree to which target 
words connoting independence or interdependence were primed by words for particular 
action types in a lexical decision task could be used to assess implicit agency assessments. 
More broadly, priming studies have been considered as ways of investigating affordances that 
arise as nonconscious responses to situational, cultural stimuli (e.g., Morling and Lamoreaux, 
2008). Such measures are particularly useful in revealing information that people might 
explicitly reject because their expression may have negative social consequences. This would 
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be of especial interest regarding the dynamics between Modalities, in which explicit and 
implicit assessments of agency may contradict each other for counter-normative actions. 
Finally, the growing work on cultural neuroscience might offer novel perspectives on how to 
approach and measure self-construal (Ambady, & Bharucha, 2009; Jiang, Varnum, Hou, & 
Han, 2014; Kim, & Sasaki, 2014; Ma, & Han, 2011). 
The third general implication is that the antecedents of self-construal include not only 
institutional or norm-based aspects of culture, but also interactional or relational ones that 
contribute to self-agency. Intermediate self-agency assessment involves the agent perceiving 
the other and their joint affordances relative to the action in hand, and this has an impact on 
the agent’s sense of agency and self-construal. Scant research, however, has investigated the 
impact of others’ characteristics on dominant self-construals, despite McGuire’s (1984) 
argument that the social environment is a strong determinant of the accessibility of self-
perception. Gardner, Gabriel, and Hochschild, (2002) suggest that self-construal is related to 
social comparison, thus linking self-construal and social environment. They further argue that 
‘it is probable that a large determinant of the outcome of comparison processes may be the 
current self-construal of the individual’ (p. 240). Social variables such as power or status vary 
contextually, and their moderation of social affordances in contributing to self-agency might 
help explain contextual changes in self-construal. Perhaps the most direct expression of self-
agency in the social environment is power, which is both reflected in and directive of 
ascriptions of self-agency for normatively valenced actions (see above). Assessing the 
relations between social-interactional variables and self-construal again suggests going 
beyond correlational methods. For example, the effect of power on self-construal could be 
assessed by using quasi-experimental methods (comparing the self-construal of different 
groups with pre-existing power or status differences, e.g. Voyer & Reader, 2013), or 
experimental methods (manipulating the perceived sense of power or status experimentally). 
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Or it could be employed as an additional independent variable in the non-explicit methods 
outlined above. 
In sum, the Agency View both echoes previous general discussions that call for 
methodological pluralism in the study of self-construal, and offers some novel specific 
suggestions about how this might be achieved. 
Future Research Directions 
Our conceptual model offers a novel way to understand self-construal mechanisms, by 
relating self-agency to self-construal. It offers an account of the relations between a small set 
of variables that are important to explaining self-construal. Other variables and approaches 
appear to intuitively to be connected to self-agency, which could lead to fruitful empirical 
and theoretical investigations in future. We note two here, both concerned with how people 
regulate their actions (see Footnote 4). 
An important set of connections concerns how people regulate or direct their actions 
or understand their ability to do so. One area of recent research has emphasized self-
construal’s additional impact on the way goals are approached, connecting it to regulatory 
focus theory (Lee, Aaker, and Gardner, 2000; Higgins, 1997). Regulatory focus theory 
suggests that movement toward a goal may focus on opportunities offered by satisfying that 
goal (‘promoting’ the goal) or on the threats arising, for example, from failure (‘preventing’ 
losses). Lee et al. (2000) find a tendency for individuals with dominant independent self-
construal to be promotion-focused, whereas those with dominant interdependence tend to be 
prevention-focused, though the former shift to prevention in contexts that emphasize the 
impact of their behavior on others (e.g., team events). The implication is that different 
regulatory foci result from different self-construals. Our suggestion here is complementary: 
regulatory focus is one way in which self-construal influences ongoing self-agency 
assessments in the implicit and intermediate modalities. However, an area for empirical 
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investigation would concern the scope for mismatches between Modalities may add further 
flexibility, enabling individuals to avoid responsibility in their self-construal, for counter-
normative instances of action promotion or prevention. 
A second, more complex set of connections is with the theory of self-regulation 
(Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Carver & Scheier, 2000, 2009; Zimmerman, 2000). Self-
regulation broadly concerns the capacity of the self to alter behavior in accordance with 
demands such as internally or externally defined standards or goals. Self-monitoring is a 
cyclical process, in which feedback from prior actions is used to make adjustments to 
ongoing activity, so as to bring it closer to the standard. Individuals may experience 
conflicting goals (e.g., personal versus social-normative), and the monitoring and regulation 
processes help ensure that they do not consistently contradict social norms. The dynamic 
processes of self-regulation echo those that we have suggested enter into self-agency 
assessment; however, testing actions against a normative standard in self-regulation, requires 
a prior assessment and acceptance of self-agency for those actions (Kareklas, Carlson, & 
Muehling, 2012). Three empirical issues suggest themselves. First, self-regulation tends to 
concern actions for which self-agency is usually independent, so that the individual self can 
be assessed as succeeding or failing to meet the standard. Our view suggests the possibility of 
investigating whether the same processes of regulation of behavior towards normative goals 
would also arise in cases of interdependent self-agency. Second, self-regulation in general 
predicts that a failure to match a given normative standard motivates future efforts to better 
match it (as long as the individual has sufficient motivation towards the goal and sufficient 
self-regulatory strength or willpower); that is, the person assumes self-agency for the failure. 
Our view suggests the possibility of investigating how and when the failure to meet standards 
could lead to denial of self-agency. A third, broader set of possibilities concerns how self-
regulation processes relate to the proposed connection between self-agency and self-
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construal. Since self-regulation typically concerns regulation of self over a series or range of 
actions, one angle of investigation would concern how variations in assessments of self-
agency for a type of action might feed into the self-regulation process, and how this might 
then connect to self-construal. Another possibility arises from the role of motivation in self-
regulation: self-monitoring is more active in attempting to reach the standard when there is 
higher motivation towards succeeding in the action; so self-regulation processes might 
influence self-agency assessment, perhaps by modulating intermediate self-agency’s 
perception of affordances, or explicit self-agency’s assessment of responsibility for an action. 
These issues suggest some very fruitful lines of empirical inquiry. 
Conclusion 
Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) theory of self-construal changed how psychologists 
understood phenomena of self-perception, by emphasizing the different ways individuals 
relate to others. The present article discussed the current understanding of self-construal 
processes and antecedents, and proposed a new view of self-construal as a process of the self 
shaped by the interaction between self-agency, social and cultural affordances. As a process 
of the self resulting from self-agency assessment, self-construal is likely to be less stable over 
time and more susceptible to change contextually. In addition, the dominant cross-cultural 
perspective of self-construal has minimized the relevance of distinguishing between 
independent and interdependent self-construal for understanding within-cultural variations of 
self-construal. Going beyond the role of gender and culture in self-construal formation to that 
of the social environment will allow researchers to deepen their understanding of self-
construal. Only when the nature and origins of self-construal differences are better 
understood can researchers realize the full potential of Markus and Kitayama’s theory. 
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Footnotes 
 1 As of April 2014, Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) article was in the top 20 most 
cited psychology references in the web of science.  2 Others have also suggested interpolating another kind of mental state (parallel the 
intermediate self-agency) between fully conceptualized representational and reasons-based 
relations to the environment on the one hand (fully explicit knowledge) and more simply 
physical causal relations to the environment on the other hand (implicit) for a broad array of 
mental processes (e.g., Dreyfus, 2005; Rowlands, 2006; Wheeler, 2005; see Karmiloff-Smith, 
1996, 2002, for a more complex view). This intermediate type of state is partly explicit in 
comprising a separate element of representation in thought, usable by different parts or 
processes of the system (unlike implicit states), but is not available to conscious awareness or 
judgment (unlike truly explicit states). 
 3 Relevant philosophical views include ‘extended’ mind or situated cognition (e.g., 
Clark, 1987), the connection between social construction and evolution (e.g., Mallon, 2008), 
1 and Millikan’s (1996) conception of ‘pushmi-pullyu’ mental states. Psychological 
perspectives have also proposed such intertwining of different kinds of representations 
(Baldwin, 1997): for example, ‘enactive memory’, in which recall from memory is tied to the 
reasons for it and the actions it supports (e.g., Glenberg, 1997; Neisser, 1988). Another 
involves treating affect as information in cognitive judgments, so that they are functionally 
inseparable (e.g., Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). Yet another view is that it may not be possible 
to separate affective from ‘descriptive’ aspects of representations (e.g., Barsalou, Niedenthal, 
Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003; Duncan & Barrett, 2007; Panksepp & Northoff, 2009). 
 4 Other interesting areas for future research would include investigating how the three 
levels of self-agency assessment relate to typical dual process models in social cognition and 
decision-making research (e.g., Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013, Samson & Voyer, 
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2013). 
